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Globalisat ion as an Agent of  
Party Ideological  Change: 
The Case of the Turkish Religious Right 
 
 
Hakan Köni 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the impact of globalisation on the transformations in the ideological 
orientation of the Turkish religious right. Studies on such changes often trace the causes of 
party change to three different variables, these being: leadership change, dominant party 
coalition change, and change in the party environment. As an example of change in party 
environment is arguably globalisation – which could be identified in short as economic and 
political liberalisation, democratisation, multilateralism, and intensification of individualism – 
bringing pressure to bear for party change. While the Turkish religious right was a substantially 
conservative movement in the past, thanks to a growing interest in economic development and 
prosperity, political rights and liberties offered by globalisation, it has acquired considerable 
liberal tendencies particularly in the second half of the 1990s.     
 
 
Introduction  
It is commonly argued by specialists of Turkish politics that the Turkish religious right has 
gradually abandoned its uncompromising ideological stance, particularly in the second half of 
the 1990s. The change is often attributed to a multiplicity of factors among which we could cite 
the pressures applied by the secularist state elites,1 prevention of Necmettin Erbakan from 
carving a durable role for himself in national politics, the rise of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as a 
credible Islamist leader,2 the emergence of a moderate group in the movement,3 and of course 
the impact of globalisation.4 Globalisation is argued to be associated with the process of change 
with its contribution to the birth of a prosperity-seeking middle class of entrepreneurs, 
intellectuals,5 and civil society organisations; and most importantly with its channelling of the 
movement towards the adoption and accommodation of those global values which promise 
greater prosperity, rights and liberties.6  
 
The main goal of this paper then is to scrutinise the Turkish religious right’s embrace of 
mainstream global norms and institutions as agents of ideological moderation. An in-depth 
empirical research is conducted for this reason covering the examination of the publications, 
party programmes, interviews and speeches, newspaper reports, produced by or on the 
Turkish religious right from National View parties of 1970s, 1980s and 1990s to the rise of the 
Justice and Development Party until the mid-2000s. The analysis is conducted with the help of 
a set of theoretical tools to explain the causes of changes that the parties experience, particularly 
those which help explain the influence of environmental factors on party ideological change. 
The main argument of the paper is that while aiming to give a substantially ‘Islamic’ shape to 
Turkish political and socioeconomic life, in the second half of the 1990s the Turkish religious 
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right began the process of incorporating into its ideological profile such global norms and 
institutions as democracy, rule of law, secularism, human rights, gender rights, market economy, 
multilateralism, and ultimately to embrace global integration. While this change was often 
linked with the goal of maximising the benefits from the rights, liberties and wealth offered by 
the processes of globalisation, it was also the result of a process of learning that the Turkish 
religious right has experienced in its assessment of global norms and institutions.   
 
 
Defining the Nature and Causes of Party Change   
Harmel and Janda describe party change as “any variation, alteration or modification in how 
parties are organized, what human and material resources they can draw upon, what they stand 
for and what they do”; understanding it more generally as any change in party organisation, 
programme, goals and strategies.7 Janda similarly studies the processes of party change with a 
look at the variations in six specific factors which include political tactics, organisational 
structure, issue orientation, organisational identity, goal orientation, and organisational death.8 
  
As to the causes that produce party change, a very rich inventory of variables is offered. Often 
the changes in a party’s behaviour and policies is argued to be a product of changes in one or 
some of three variables which include leadership change, dominant coalition change, and 
environmental change. Leadership change, first, is believed to carry a significant potential for 
party change for the reason that different leaders could have differences in their abilities, 
personal characteristics, and their orientation and willingness to engage with issues, and thus 
transition of party leadership from one person to another is commonly accepted to bring about 
many changes.9 Gilmore takes the differences in party leadership for granted and argues that 
leadership change stands as a critical occasion in the lifespan of parties for the reconsideration 
of the party agenda, past strategies, and future plans.10 Thus Harmel et. al., based on their 
examination of a large pool of cases, maintain that leadership change could produce party 
change no matter how a party performs in elections, and that change could be more substantial 
if the party has a strong leadership structure.11   
 
Concerning dominant coalition change, secondly, Harmel and Janda, by making an analysis of 
some selected party change examples, detect that party change could occur only with an 
imposition from the dominant coalition.12 Similarly, Harmel and Tan argue that for all the 
efforts that such large organisations as political parties resist change, there must be a power 
group that facilitates change.13 Based on a study of seven cases of dominant party coalition 
change, they observe that if there is an intense factional rivalry originating from some 
ideological, strategic and organisational preferences, and if the traditional party faction is 
defeated, it is very likely to see a substantial party change. And they maintain that if dominant 
coalition change is accompanied with leadership change, then party change could occur even 
more substantially.14      
    
As to the environmental change, thirdly, which could be defined as any change originating from 
the exterior of the party, a sophisticated analysis is offered by Harmel and Janda with regard to 
its influence on party change.15 Harmel and Janda examine the effect of the environmental 
change on party change with regard to the abilities of the parties to achieve their primary goals.16 
Accordingly, for parties identified as vote-maximising, a major decline in the electoral share of 
the party is observed as the main environmental change stimulating party change.17 For office-
maximising parties, furthermore, the leading external stimulus could be anything that impedes 
the party’s participation in the government. For policy/ideology-advocating parties, thirdly, 
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which are distinguished with their concern for policy purity, external stimuli may include major 
ideological transformations in the world, domestic constitutional changes, globalisation, a rise in 
environmental concerns, among many others. 18  And finally, for intraparty-democracy 
maximising parties which are concerned with a broad representation of the views of the party 
members, changes in party membership numbers, change in the character of party members 
(e.g., from agrarian to industrial classes), or general changes in the views of party members 
could be the type of changes that could produce party change.19  
 
 
Environmental Change as a Cause of Party Ideological Change   
In a comprehensive study of over 25 parties, Harmel and Janda try to explore the set of 
environmental factors which apply and impact on the prospects of party ideological 
extremism.20 Grouping parties as rightist and leftist in ideological terms, Harmel and Janda 
contend that party ideological extremism is closely linked with the absence or presence of a 
number of factors. These factors include the nature of the electoral system (correlation value: -
0.33),21 number of political parties (0.50),22 possibility of rule by a coalition government (0.50), 
degree of regime opposition (-0.12), affluence (-0.20) and sectorial inequality (0.32).23  
 
In compliance with Harmel and Janda’s findings regarding the first two variables, which is the 
nature of the electoral system and the number of political parties, Downs argues that parties are 
indeed all motivated to maximise their votes and that is often the only thing they consider when 
the party ideology is formulated.24 Accordingly, if a party senses that it would lose in the 
elections, it quickly reformulates its ideology to increase its chances in the next elections. Yet 
Robertson maintains that parties cannot move in an all-pragmatist fashion having the goal to 
enter the parliament with the highest ratio of seats only.25 A party’s chances to enter the 
parliament also depend on its ability to maintain ideological consistency towards the public and 
to follow its promises when it is in the government.26 Classifying parties as mainstream and 
niche parties, Adams et. al. argue, based on research conducted over eight European party 
systems, that niche parties like the communists and extreme nationalists are less responsive to 
shifts in their electoral share whether it changes positively or negatively and that they often get 
penalised by the electorate when they change their policy programmes while the picture is often 
the reverse for mainstream parties.27     
 
The correlation value of 0.50 measured between the possibility of rule by a coalition and the 
level of party ideological extremism tells us that the higher the possibility of coalition, the more 
extreme the parties could become no matter what rate of the votes they obtain. Accordingly, 
major parties will need the support of minor parties to establish a government, minor parties 
could survive with all their ideological extremism. This proposition is contested, however. 
Lipset and Rokkan, for instance, argue that the possibility of a rule by coalition could rather 
bear a moderating effect because even if there could be a possibility of coalition, minor parties 
with less ideological programmes are more likely to be approached. According to Lipset and 
Rokkan, this was the most important reason behind the moderation of Western labour parties 
in the 20th century.28 
 
Regarding Harmel and Janda’s last two variables, affluence and sectorial inequality, a parallel 
study draws attention to a similar set of findings. In a research covering over 65 societies and 
75% of the world’s population, Inglehart and Baker observe a remarkable correlation between 
degree of economic development and adoption of liberal values. They argue that as societies 
transition from agrarian to industrial, as the income level reaches above a certain level, and as 
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the income disparity declines, they acquire a strong tendency to adopt liberal, rational, tolerant 
and trusting values. Economic development is seen to bring about a rise in the level of 
education, and improvements in communication technologies too enable the people to 
become more knowledgeable about the ways that things are done in other parts of the world, 
which tends to lead them to adopt features that appear more efficient and effective. This in turn 
facilitates a process of moderation, affinity and sympathy among the people, causing a decline 
in the appeal of ideological extremism sponsored by parties and other political groups.29 
 
In line with this, Wilson maintains that as a result of tremendous socio-economic changes 
taking place after the Second World War, which included prolonged economic prosperity and 
growth, decline in the intensity of social class distinctions, communications revolution, etc., 
parties have been compelled to minimise their ideological profile for reasons of survival.30 
Ideologies were losing their appeal because societies were now more in favour of broad-based 
social and political consensus. In line with this, Mair maintains that the Democratic Party in the 
United States and Fianna Fáil in Ireland underwent a remarkable change in reaction to rising 
national wealth and income levels. While these parties were characterised as the parties of the 
poor in the past, they began to pay more attention to the demands and the votes of the affluent. 
For Mair, the electoral success of the Likud Party in Israel in 1977 was the result of the failure 
of the Labour Party to adapt to changing socioeconomic conditions which included in the 
Israeli case the increasing ratio of Afro-Asian people in the population, changing age structure 
and growing importance of the cities.31  
 
 
Globalisat ion as a Driver 
 
Defining globalisation is not an easy task. In the realm of economics, to start with, globalisation 
is often understood as a process which reinforces economic liberalism. In the domestic sphere, 
the pursuit of globalising trends often means the minimisation of the state and the transfer of 
key economic activities to the free forces of the market. And in the international sphere, it is 
generally understood as the removal of barriers against international trade to facilitate cross-
border mobility of goods, services, technology and capital.32 The main driving force behind 
economic globalisation is of course the production of wealth. But the main agent of economic 
globalisation, trade, is not a new phenomenon. Indeed, it is one of the oldest and most 
enduring human occupations. But it was in the course of the last century that globalisation 
really took hold and in the 20th century the volume of trade increased so substantially as to 
render it an even more important phenomenon. Trade has been easier that the developments 
achieved in science and technology which have led to increases in the type and variety of goods 
being traded as well as the vehicles to transport them between distant regions.33  
 
Economic globalisation was greatly facilitated with the establishment of General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank after the 
Second World War with their major goals to minimise barriers to international trade such as 
tariffs, quotas, and fees, and with the mandate to correct international and domestic market 
failures. This process accelerated with the collapse of the Soviet Union and its state-led 
economic model, and of course the end of the Cold War. These important obstacles to 
economic globalisation were removed in one swift move in 1991.34  
 
In politics, secondly, we can generally talk about two different trends of globalisation – one in 
international politics and the other in domestic politics. In international politics, globalisation is 
often said to refer to a process of strengthening multilateralism among countries. It is argued 
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that countries are strongly motivated to cooperate in regional and international agreements 
because of an entrenched and enduring set of problems whose solution is commonly agreed to 
require international cooperation. Among these problems one could cite terrorism, 
proliferation of WMDs, drug trafficking, organised crime, human trafficking, environmental 
disasters, and poverty. 35  In domestic politics, secondly, the term globalisation is generally 
understood as the widespread adoption of the norms and institutions of democracy, human 
rights, rule of law, secularism, good governance, and gender rights. As in international relations, 
pragmatism appears as a leading motivation here for it promises political participation, rights 
and liberties for the people as opposed to totalitarianism and dictatorships.36 
 
Political and economic globalisation could occasionally be facilitated with foreign intervention 
and pressures. It is well known that liberalisation of the developing world was a leading foreign 
policy goal of the US after the end of the Second World War. Since the mid-1950s, most 
countries have encountered pressures from the US, and from the EU and other Western 
actors too, to introduce reforms at home as a precondition for economic, diplomatic and 
military support. Wallerstein argues that what we call globalisation is little more than a 
relationship of dependency by which the West exploits the rest for its own development, 
leaving the rest in a cycle of underdevelopment. Accordingly, benefits offered by globalisation 
could sometimes be ensured with the service of the countries to the interests of major powers 
only.37 These are ripe for the discussion in the Middle East of course, not just for it being seen 
as the main reason for the war in Iraq, but also for the West’s conditional support for the 
democratic revolts in the region. 
 
In sociological terms, finally, the term globalisation often denotes the replacement of collective, 
authoritarian, and close social structures with individualist, pluralist, democratic and open ones 
as often enjoyed in the West. Social globalisation is thought to be facilitated through the 
widespread use of communications networks (television, radio, telephone, internet, etc.) which 
shorten the distances and bring the people closer. Societies get introduced to an intense 
process of observation and dialogue and they often adopt those values that appear to be more 
emancipatory and liberalising.38 The background of same developments could lead to a similar 
trend in cultural terms too, contributing to the emergence of cultures of synthesis among 
countries. As a result, dress styles, cuisines, social manner, festivals all come to share notable 
commonalities.39   
 
 
Turkey’s Globalisat ion 
 
From the establishment of the Turkish Republic to the end of the Second World War and 
transition to democracy in 1950s, the Turkish economy was characterised by a substantially 
state-led regulated economy. Due to the lack of a developed industrial sector and a powerful 
entrepreneurial class, state regulation and control was deemed to be a necessity in the 
management of the economy. With such factors as the Great Depression in 1929 and then the 
Second World War in 1939, state control grew substantially in Turkey.40 That was the case 
until after the War and the arrival of a new force in Turkish politics. The Democrat Party 
which came to power in 1950 and held office for the next 10 years had developed plans to 
restructure the Turkish economy according to liberal economic principles. The party had trust 
in the potential of economic liberalism to generate wealth while also expecting to benefit from 
the funds provided by the US via the Marshall Plan. The funds provided by the United States 
were invested in agricultural mechanisation to produce a substantial growth in the volume of 
agricultural outputs. With the rise in the prices of agricultural products, the DP government 
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was able to show remarkable progress in the economic development of the country in the 
1950s.41  
 
Liberalisation of the economy had its drawbacks, however. The economy was now more 
susceptible to fluctuations in world markets and Turkey was exposed to serious crises from 
time to time with a rising volume of public debt. The most serious crisis was the 1973 oil price 
rises which was prompted by the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 during which the price of the oil 
quadrupled in less than two years. Turkey’s economic crisis was exacerbated with the Iranian 
revolution which added the price of oil to well over the 1975 price. As a consequence, the 
Turkish economy entered a long period of recession, and with unsuccessful devaluations 
introduced, the economy was in ruins.42  
 
The 1980 military intervention in Turkey brought an economist, Turgut Özal, to the attention 
of the public. A champion of free market economies, Özal was appointed by the military-
guided government as the minister of economy. Özal would be provided with greater powers 
for leading economic reforms when he became prime minister in 1983. In an attempt to boost 
the economy, Özal decided to replace the long-followed import substitution strategy with an 
export-led growth strategy. He put in place a major campaign to privatise publicly-owned 
economic enterprises, introduce flexible exchange and interest rates, facilitate capital mobility, 
and promote competition. The process was further invigorated with the repatriation of 
immigrant workers and their investments in Turkey. During Özal’s premiership, Turkey 
achieved remarkable economic development, and major rises in the volume of foreign 
investments which in turn boosted the country’s manufacturing sector.43  
 
In the same period, the state monopoly on media outlets and communications – television, 
radio – was ended and the country’s universities and schools became exposed to a great 
communication revolution which in turn fuelled an educational revolution in the country’s leap 
forward. This period witnessed a drastic surge in the number of private media corporations, 
educational institutions, and civil society organisations. The consumption of television, radio, 
cinema and video products rose tremendously to be further multiplied by the arrival of the 
internet and mobile telephoney in the 1990s. These developments were instrumental in the 
familiarisation of Turkish society with Western approaches to dealing with political, social and 
economic issues of the day. İn a sentence, Turks were now able to better observe and 
understand how the people benefited from such norms and institutions as democracy, human 
rights, equality, gender rights, individualism, with a greatly enhanced degree of awareness.44  
 
 
Turkish Religious Right in Transit ion  
 
National View Ideology 
 
The National View45 was a highly religious conservative movement in ideological terms.46 The 
scale of its conservatism can be demonstrated through an analysis of its views in a number of 
policy areas, such as foreign policy, economy, education, and law. In foreign policy, the 
movement was opposed to the establishment of close ties with the US, UN, the European 
Community, NATO, IMF and similar states and organisations in the West. The reason for that 
was generally the idea supported by Erbakan and his close associates that the West was 
primarily concerned to promote Christian and Jewish interests often to the detriment of the 
Muslims. It was believed that the West, and particularly the US, was secretly supporting the 
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Serbs, Armenians (against the Azeris in 1991), PKK with a goal to weaken, divide or occupy 
the Muslim lands.47 
 
For the National View, the Customs Union and European Economic Community were 
structures and institutions used by the Christian European states to reinforce the unity and 
cooperation among the Christians. Turkey’s integration process with Europe would then be a 
process of Christianisation of the Muslim country. And closer cooperation with Christian 
Europe would also weaken Turkish sovereignty and independence.48 The ideal, from their 
perspective, was the development and deepening of the ties with the Muslim world. Religious 
and historical commonalities were a precondition for the establishment of international 
associations for this camp. Turkey, therefore, had to lead the establishment of an Islamic UN, 
economic community and military partnership.49 
 
In terms of the economy, the movement was in support of a kind of Islamist corporatism. The 
state was given a very substantial role in the economy to serve as the leading agent of economic 
development. The state would prepare the necessary infrastructure for the development of a 
powerful industrial sector. Turkey would then somehow move up from an agricultural to an 
industrial society, as facilitated through substantial state involvement in the economy. While 
trying to carry out this goal, the people were expected to assume a feeling of responsibility, 
morality, service and honesty. The economy would not be left in the hands of a group of profit-
seeking individuals, as in the Western free market economies. The state would play an 
important role in eliminating income disparity too. The source of many illnesses ravaging 
societies in our century was the free market, in their view, with the habits of extravagance, 
luxury, self-preservation and gratification that they bring with them. The interest, the sine-qua-
none of free market economies, was an institution of oppression and it had to be removed.50  
 
In politics, generally, the movement often argued that Islamic political ideals were much 
superior to their counterparts in the West with its style of government, laws, rights, and liberties. 
Islamic law had been applied for over centuries and its virtues were proven. They were the 
source of many great Islamic empires and civilisations. The movement was thus on occasions 
propagating the Islamisation of the state and legal system. On 13th January 1991, in one of those 
extreme but still rare cases, Necmettin Erbakan was quoted as saying:    
 
If you don’t serve the Welfare Party, your prayers are not accepted. One cannot be a 
Muslim without serving the Welfare… This party is an army of Jihad… If you are a 
Muslim, you have to be a soldier of this army…51  
 
The movement was at least in favour of the introduction of a multiple system of law by which 
the religious people would be allowed to benefit from judicial services according to Islamic law 
while the secular laws would be preserved for the others.52  
 
Education of religion and morality occupied an important place in the National View agenda. 
According to Erbakan, Imam-Hatip Schools had to be improved in number and capabilities. 
Every university had to incorporate faculties of theology and students studying at normal public 
schools had to be given greater hours of education in the study of religion and morality. For the 
National View, morality, respect, dignity, integrity and wider traditional (conservative) values 
were important both for normative and pragmatist reasons and education was the most 
important instrument for their transmission to the generations.53  
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The Welfare Party:  From Government to Its Closure   
 
A substantially modernist approach evolved with the introduction of the Welfare Party (WP) to 
government. The WP was the victorious party of December 1995 general elections with 
21.38% of the votes. To form the government, it had to agree on a coalition with the True Path 
Party, however, which had taken 19.18% of the votes. Once in government, facing the realities 
and the necessities of rule at first hand, the party rapidly adjusted its perspectives to take stock 
of the situation on the ground.54 In foreign policy, thus, an attempt to change the orientation of 
the country from the West to the Muslim East was deemed to be counterproductive. The party 
began to appreciate the potential contribution of West-dominant international trade, finance 
and investment to the Turkish economy. The import of technological and industrial 
infrastructure was an equally important necessity. To this end, the WP’s perspectives on such 
matters as EU membership, strategic relations with the United States, cooperation with such 
global economic organisations like IMF and World Bank was fully revised.  
 
The turn of the party towards the West was also manifest in the emergence of favourable 
thinking about Western political values and principles such as democracy, human rights and 
the rule of law. These values and principles were now being seen as part of a universal culture 
which transcended religious considerations to which all countries had to pay respect. Turkey’s 
NATO membership and strategic partnership with the US was critical in this context which had 
to be preserved without any change.  
 
In February 1997, thus, the Minister of State Abdullah Gül joined in an official visit to the US 
during which he emphasised the friendly and multidimensional nature of Turkish-American 
relations and his hope to improve them further.55 Hearing US officials’ support for and belief in 
democracy, pluralism, free and fair elections, and open society, at first hand Gül openly 
expressed his happiness to believe in the same political values.56 Accordingly, the WP remained 
only critical of some secularist dimensions of public life in Turkey but only because they were 
inhibiting freedom of belief and conscience contrary to what was the case in the US.57 
 
Further to this common understanding of the potential US contribution to Turkey’s political 
and economic development, the government showed deference to a number of warnings and 
advice by the US officials. Accordingly, for instance, Turkey was expected to downgrade its 
relations with Iran.58 American officials expressed their concerns about religious radicalism in 
Turkey too, stating that Turkey would be accepted in the Western community only if it 
remained secular. In a meeting between US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and deputies 
of EU Commission in February 1997, the deputies reported that the meeting was held “to 
emphasize the importance given by the USA and the EU to secular Turkey, to express the 
rising concerns against the problems”.59  
 
In his visit, Gül expressed the resolution of the Turkish government to become a member of 
the EU. In response to concerns that Turkey was slowly moving away from the West, Gül said 
that “This concern is groundless. If there is such a concern, let Turkey become an EU state 
immediately”.60  The desire of the party to lead Turkey into EU membership was better 
understood with Gül’s warnings to veto NATO’s expansion attempts in case of a motivation by 
EU to close the gates to Turkey.61 Gül’s attempts were supported by Erbakan too for he was 
also now emphasising the importance of establishing an atmosphere of understanding and 
communication with the US. In their view, America was a global power, and Turkey must not 
omit this factor in formulating its domestic and foreign policy.62  
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The Israel policy of the party also became surprisingly flexible. Pressure from the military was 
only one of the reasons that could explain this change. Equally influential was the pressures 
applied by the US. The government was advised by the US to maintain friendly relations with 
Israel or to risk the loss of US economic, political and military support. In its demand for 
advanced US military and technological items, the US sometimes urged Turkey to buy them 
through Israel to consolidate Turkish-Israeli friendly relations.63 Apart from these asymmetric 
calculations, the idea of benefitting from Israeli intelligence, particularly against the PKK also 
had some impact on the development of relations which had proved very useful indeed as it 
was seen in the capture of Abdullah Öcalan in 1999.64 The government was encouraged to 
approach Israel for one more reason: to benefit from the influence of the Jewish lobby in 
America to solicit favourable US decisions about Turkey.65 For all these reasons, Gül indicated 
that WP was certainly not an enemy of Israel.66 
 
When the WP was closed on 16th January 1998, the leading party member Bülent Arınç, while 
referring to some careless actions committed by the party, explained the plan of the reformists 
like himself to establish a new party closer to the centre and open to the world. The new party 
would cherish democracy and human rights and it would not try to monopolise religion.67 
 
The Virtue Party 
 
Established on 17th December 1997 by Ismail Alptekin as a precaution, the Virtue Party (VP) 
quickly gathered all the members of the WP in its organisation. The closure of the WP did not 
mean that its elected representatives would abandon politics. Apart from Erbakan and a 
number of other party members who were banned from politics, all the rest moved en masse 
into the VP. The modernist approach taking form during the service of the WP in government 
acquired a more solid shape in VP’s policy perspectives. As soon as things settled down, a team 
of party members were given to the task of formulating that drew clear differences with the 
traditional National View line. It was stated in the outset that the VP would not follow the oft-
promoted Just Order 68  and National View ideas and the priority of the party would be 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law.69  
 
In the first party congress held in May 1998, Recai Kutan was elected as the new party leader 
after a fierce competition with Abdullah Gül. The more popular Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was 
not a candidate for he was serving a prison sentence imposed on him by the Constitutional 
Court for ‘violating secularism’. Erdoğan and Gül were the leaders of the reformist coalition 
together with Bülent Arınç in the VP with their calls for a more democratic and liberal party. 
 
The party programme was introduced by Kutan with a slogan of “change”. Kutan was saying 
that “We don’t use the concept of Just Order. It has been deleted. Just Order was an academic 
debate indee”. Accordingly, even Erbakan had not tried to put it into action when he was the 
prime minister.70 For Kutan, what was required was the transfer of democracy, human rights 
and freedoms to Turkey, for it was such matters that had made the West superior.71 The 
necessity of this process of adaptation was explained as follows by Gül:  
 
It is inevitable to have such vivid political discussions in our country for we are 
introduced to a rapid process of change together with the world… By time and 
experience, people learn to think more realistically and in a healthy way. It is without 
question that – as the leaders of societies – the political parties, politicians and thinkers 
cannot stay outside of this development… The relationship between politics and 
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religion must be limited to measures taken for freedom of religion and religious 
education.72      
 
In the party programme, it was indicated that the party was in support of economic liberalism. 
The major goal of the party in the economy would be the minimisation of the role of the state, 
promotion of entrepreneurialism and foreign investment, reduction of taxes and privatisation.73 
In line with this, Kutan stated that: “We are not a party isolated from its environment. We are 
in favour of the freedom of enterprise”.74 Arınç was similarly pressing for liberal reforms: there 
was a need to reformulate the economic policy of the movement. The Just Order discourse 
sounded well in rhetoric but it was very difficult to put it into practice.75 The difficulty of 
removing interest from the economy was recognised by Kutan also. Kutan indicated that “The 
economic system in hand is programmed according to an economy of interest. It is not possible 
to change it. An interest-based economy can remain, but there could be a space for interest-free 
economic applications together with it”.76  
 
EU membership was also given a priority in the VP party programme. The notion of the EU as 
a Christian club, Jewish tool or a contemporary type of imperialism was abandoned.77 The 
reason for this change was explained by Kutan as follows:  
 
Circumstances are changing in the world. Conditions of the day are not the same as 
those in the past. We have made an assessment according to the conditions of the day 
and we revised our old EU policy. We now say that Turkey must enter the EU.78  
 
The US was given a special importance in VP foreign policy. In recognition of the US 
prominence in world politics, Arınç went so far as to say that they would not do politics without 
taking the US into account as a global power but also because of its advocacy of global political 
values. 79  In line with this, while in a visit to the US, Kutan emphasised how important 
democracy was for the VP. Accordingly, the VP was certainly in support of secularism but 
Turkey had to take some lessons from secularist applications in the US which were liberating 
rather than repressive. While meeting with various Jewish lobbies, Kutan indicated that the VP 
was in favour of improved relations with Israel as well.80   
 
The Justice and Development Party 
 
Despite all the care demonstrated by the VP to shun its old Islamist image and the ideological 
profile of the movement, the party was still accused of violating secularist ideals and principles 
as its predecessor, the WP, had done. The party was taken to court and the case starting in 
May 1999 took two years until June 2001 to complete. The outcome: the Constitutional Court 
ruled in favour of the closure of the VP. After the closure of the party, the intraparty splits 
emerged, leading to the establishment of two new parties. While the traditionalists led by Kutan 
united in a party named as Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party), the reformists led by Gül and Arınç 
established Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party), later to be headed by 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.  
 
The very popular Erdoğan was an active member of religious conservative movements since 
the 1970s. He was a member of the National Turkish Student Union known for its opposition 
to communism and Zionism. In 1976, he became the head of the Istanbul youth branch of the 
party. In 1984, he was appointed as the party head in Beyoğlu to be promoted as the party 
head of Istanbul in 1985. In 1994, Erdoğan was elected as the Municipal Governor of Istanbul 
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where he had built much of his reputation and credibility with his distinguished service to 
Istanbul.81 
 
Gathering all the reformists in its organisation, the Justice and Development Party (JDP) came 
up with a programme in greater deference to global socio-political and economic values. It was 
frequently indicated that the party would be a resilient proponent and protector of democracy, 
human rights, rule of law, gender rights and market economy at home, with a goal to spread 
these values to its near abroad as well. The major tenants of its foreign policy were specified as 
multilateralism, multidimensionality, liberalisation, and regional and global integration.82 These 
were the set of ideal norms that had to be adopted and respected by all world countries. These 
were indeed the core of a global political culture which incited the world communities to act in 
cooperation and partnership.83  
 
In September 2000, Erdoğan said that, “I am behind a campaign for a new formation devoted 
to the development of a new political mentality and new approaches to domestic and 
international problems of our country”.84 In Erdoğan’s words, Turkey was in need of an 
“intellectual change”. The new formation that he was advocating would lead to an awakening of 
Turkey to recapture its past glorious civilisation.85 Erdoğan indicated that radicalism was not the 
appropriate response to dealing with problems, these had to be dealt in a peaceful way.86 In line 
with this, Erdoğan stressed that they had put off the National View dress and advised the party 
members to forget that programme. He went on to say: 
 
There is no space in JDP for political and ideological ghosts which shadow the 
horizon of the people or for unrealistic political and ideological dreams… It is not 
possible for ideological considerations or shallow world views to find space in JDP.87  
 
Gül expressed in similar terms the irresistibility of global trends.88 Despite all the changes, Gül 
was still critical of VP policies. Gül was saying that attempts to make politics with a religious 
discourse were more harmful than beneficial. Political parties were not instruments of teaching 
and spreading religion. Gül was portraying himself as well as Erdoğan as rational, realist and 
modernist politicians. Dervish lodge-like parties where members leave their shoes in front of 
the doors of the party centres had to be got rid of.89  
 
Thanks to advances in science and technology, people were brought closer together to 
contribute to the emergence of a global culture. Relations between societies were now more 
closely defined with trust, cooperation, interdependence and interest. Elements of cultures 
inhibiting the progress of societies had to be abandoned and those of them promoting the 
above processes were to be brought to the forefront.90 In line with this, Gül argued that the JDP 
was established to prove that “a Muslim society is capable of change and renovation to adapt to 
the necessities of the age while preserving its traditions and identity”.91   
 
In foreign policy, multilateralism was to be at the core of the party’s outlook. It was believed 
that the economic and political progress of the country was dependent on the ability to work in 
cooperation and partnership with other countries.92 That was also the key to the resolution of a 
list of problems troubling the countries with a global reach. The type of problems identified by 
JDP deputies included terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, environmental disasters, organised 
crime, drug trafficking and human trade. The trans-border character of these problems meant 
that the countries were supposed to act in coordination for their resolution and the JDP was 
prepared for that.93 
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The motivation to improve relations with the US was also preserved by the JDP. Turkey would 
maintain its military alliance with the US, keep its membership to NATO, but also augment 
relations in the political, diplomatic and economic domains.94 The two countries were said to 
share common views on the contemporary political and economic values, and they jointly 
encouraged others to adopt them, particularly those in the Middle East and Eurasia. In doing 
this, the JDP was also expecting greater support from the IMF and the US government to help 
Turkey recover from its structural economic difficulties.95  
 
In line with this, the JDP undertook a major mission in the Middle East to introduce reforms 
in the areas of democracy, human rights, rule of law, good governance, gender rights and the 
enhancement of free market economies. 96  JDP was particularly pleased to receive US 
endorsement of Turkey serving as a model and partner country for this purpose with its ability 
to reconcile Islam and contemporary political values.97 Regarding such strategic issues as the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the party expressly supported the implementation of the ‘Road Map’ 
prepared by the Quartet. The party was also willing to play a mediator role in the process 
between Israel and the neighbouring Arab countries. For the JDP, the resolution of the 
Palestinian issue was a key to regional and global peace.98 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Political parties are argued to be conservative organisations that resist change. Only a change in 
a number of categories – party leadership, dominant coalition, and party environment – is said 
to produce party change. Taking its guidance from the studies devoted to the analysis of the 
impact of changes in party environment on party ideological change, this paper has explored 
how economic liberalism, democratisation, political liberalisation and multilateralism, 
globalisation in short, generate a strong tendency on the part of political organisations like 
political parties to change their ideological appeal. The reason behind this tendency often 
appears to be pragmatic: the search for greater wealth, political participation, rights, liberties, 
and domestic and international peace. Sometimes for concerns to maximise their electoral 
gains and sometimes because they also learn and adapt to changing circumstances, political 
parties could also reformulate their ideological profile.   
 
It has been argued in this paper that the above concerns have been very influential in the 
change of the ideological profile of the Turkish religious right. Until the mid-1990s, the 
Turkish religious right was a characteristically conservative movement. It supported a kind of 
Islamic corporatism in the economy, introduction of Islamic norms in public life, greater 
disciplinary and moral measures in the society, minimisation of relations with the West and 
integration with the Islamic world. With the country getting economically more developed, 
channels of communication strengthened with the West and the benefits of globalisation 
becoming more apparent, the movement recast its political line towards a more liberal one. 
From the introduction of the WP into the government in 1996 to the establishment of the VP 
in 1998 and JDP in 2001, the movement has been in a trend of increasingly greater support for 
global norms and institutions, such as economic liberalism, democratisation, human rights, the 
rule of law, and multilateralism.    
 
While focusing on the impact of globalisation on the change of the Turkish religious right, the 
paper does not reject the importance of other variables in the equation. And, in fact, for many 
scholars, the pressures of the state elites were more influential than any other on the process. 
To illustrate, the National Order Party led by Erbakan was closed down in 1971 by the 
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military-led government on account of violating secularism. The successive National Salvation 
Party was again closed down in 1980 by the military for the same reason. The WP established 
in 1985 was first forced by the military to resign from the government in 1997 and then closed 
down by the Constitutional Court in 1998 with the charge of being a hotbed of anti-secular 
activities. In addition to that, the party leader, Erbakan, was prohibited from engaging in politics. 
The successor party, the VP, led by Kutan, was also brought to the court with the charge of 
violating the constitution. It too was closed down in 2001. The latest JDP has not been immune 
to the attacks of the secularists either, for it too has been brought to court twice. Though the 
JDP was not closed down, half of its budget was cut. This has meant that the members of the 
movement have had to be careful about the sensitivities of the state elites so as to avoid similar 
problems occurring again.99 
 
The rise of Erdoğan was not less of an important factor in the process. Compared to Erbakan, 
Erdoğan is often portrayed as a more democratic, open, pragmatist and intelligent person. 
Erdoğan has had a very good sense of the developments taking place in the world and has 
proved to be quick in reformulating the party profile accordingly. For Erdoğan, democracy, 
human rights, rule of law, secularism, economic liberalism, minimal state role were more ideal 
and productive compared to what was defended by the movement previously. Erdoğan has also 
proved to be very successful in persuading the masses to his ideas by also appealing to the 
concerns of the centre-right to help the electoral share of his party increase substantially. 
Erdoğan’s influence on the movement is thought to have been accelerated by Erbakan’s 
prohibition from re-entering politics forcing the movement to appoint a new leader quickly.100   
  
Finally, another factor playing a significant role in the process was the secular desire to govern, 
either as a single party or as a coalition partner. In both cases, it could be said that the 
successive parties of the movement (WP, VP or JDP) have had to shape their programmes in 
ways that would make them appeal to the broadest electoral base. This pragmatism has 
arguably rendered the party more amenable as a coalition partner. For many, the turn of the 
movement to a pro-EU, pro-US and pro-globalisation party soon after the elections was closely 
related to the goal to establish and sustain a coalition government with the True Path Party. 
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